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Abstract
This paper presents a digital VLSI design flow to create 
secure, side-channel attack (SCA) resistant integrated 
circuits. The design flow starts from a normal design in a 
hardware description language such as VHDL or Verilog 
and provides a direct path to a SCA resistant layout. In-
stead of a full custom layout or an iterative design process 
with extensive simulations, a few key modifications are 
incorporated in a regular synchronous CMOS standard 
cell design flow. We discuss the basis for side-channel 
attack resistance and adjust the library databases and 
constraints files of the synthesis and place & route proce-
dures accordingly. Experimental results show that a DPA 
attack on a regular single ended CMOS standard cell 
implementation of a module of the DES algorithm dis-
closes the secret key after 200 measurements. The same 
attack on a secure version still does not disclose the secret 
key after more than 2000 measurements.
1 Introduction 
The integrated circuit (IC) emerges more and more as 
the main vulnerability of a security application. Due to 
physical and electrical effects, it broadcasts information 
that is related to the secret key. In recent years, several 
attacks have been reported that use information from so-
called ‘side-channels’ to find the secret key. These side-
channel attacks do not tamper the security IC. They are 
non-invasive and observe the device under normal opera-
tion mode. The attacks analyze information ranging from 
time delay [1] and power consumption [2] to electromag-
netic radiation [3] and often apply statistical techniques. In 
general, SCAs do not require expensive equipment and are 
rather quick to set up. SCAs are a real threat for any device 
of which the security IC is easily observable such as smart 
cards and embedded devices.  
At first, SCAs have been fought with ad hoc counter-
measures. For instance, the addition of random power 
consuming operations obscured the data dependent varia-
tions in the power consumption. Yet over time, the attacks 
have evolved and become more and more effective. Sub-
sequently, countermeasures have been conceived at the 
different abstraction levels of the security application. It  
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started at the algorithmic level. A fine illustration is mask-
ing [4]. This technique prevents intermediate variables to 
depend on an easily accessible subset of the secret key. 
Only recently, dedicated hardware techniques have been 
presented [5],[6]. Instead of concealing or decorrelating 
the side-channel information, these techniques try not to 
create any side channel information. Goal of these coun-
termeasures is to make the power consumption of the logic 
gates independent of the data values or the Hamming dis-
tances between data values. To our knowledge, this publi-
cation is the first to present a comprehensive top-down 
automated synchronous VLSI design flow that pursues a 
constant power dissipation of the security IC.  
A major advantage of our proposed technique is that it 
is independent of the cryptographic algorithm or arithmetic 
implemented and that there is no need to train the VLSI 
designer to become a security expert or vice versa. When 
the power dissipation of the smallest building block is a 
constant and independent of the signal activity, no 
information is leaked through the power supply regardless 
of the implementation and consequently irrespective of the 
experience of the digital designer. Such a technique is an 
essential component of a secure digital design flow.  
A secure digital design flow is an automated design 
flow that creates a secure integrated circuit or system-on-
chip. The design flow starts from the design specifications 
and results in a secure side-channel attack resistant layout 
through the subsequent steps of synthesis and place & 
route. Major smart card vendors and service providers 
have recently identified such a design flow as an important 
open issue related to the general security of cryptographic 
applications [7].  
In this paper, we will transform a regular synchronous 
digital design flow into a secure digital design flow. The 
modifications and additions are inserted in the backend of 
the regular automated design flow and have been imple-
mented in a “push-button” approach. They only have a 
minimal influence on the design flow and a negligible 
overhead in design time. The additional steps required 
only a total of 6 minutes of extra CPU time for a 39K gates 
prototype IC implementing a high-throughput AES, con-
troller and fingerprint processor. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we present the secure digital design flow. We 
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first discuss two components: (1) a logic style with con-
stant power consumption and (2) a place & route tech-
nique, which controls the parasitic effects on the intercon-
nect wires. Next, the remaining components, which com-
plete the design flow, are presented. Section 3 compares 
the secure digital design flow with a regular digital design 
flow. A module of the DES algorithm is implemented. 
Area and power numbers are given and the results of a 
Differential Power Analysis are provided. While section 2 
and 3 focus on power attacks, section 4 will deal with the 
other side-channel attacks. Finally a conclusion will be 
formulated.  
2 Secure Digital Design Flow 
The secure digital design flow is depicted in Fig. 1. 
Someone familiar with a regular synchronous CMOS stan-
dard cell based digital design flow recognizes the subse-
quent steps in an IC design: logic design, logic synthesis 
and place & route. The creative part is the description of 
the circuit in a high level design language such as Verilog 
or VHDL, indicated by the “logic design” task. Nothing 
changes to this task. One can notice 2 additional steps: 
“cell substitution” and “interconnect decomposition”. 
These operations have been inserted in the backend of the 
flow and do not interfere with the creative part of a design. 
Before we discuss each step, we first elaborate on 2 impor-
tant components, which are necessary to understand the 
flow. We will start with a logic style with constant power 
consumption. The idea is to have exactly 1 switching event 
per clock cycle during which a constant amount of charge 
is used. A 100% switching factor can only be achieved 
through a dual rail logic, which has a true and a false out-
put. Consequently, the load capacitance at the 2 outputs 
must be matched to assure that the load capacitance is 
independent of the switching event. This is achieved 
through a special place & route approach, which we will 
discuss secondly.
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Fig. 1.  Main tasks of secure digital design flow.  
2.1 Wave Dynamic Differential Logic 
The cornerstone of a secure digital design flow is a 
logic style with constant power consumption. The power 
consumption of traditional standard cells and logic is de-
pendent on the signal activity. It depends on both the sig-
nal values and the signal transitions, i.e. the Hamming 
distance between consecutive data values. This is the fun-
damental reason that information can leak through the 
power supply and power attacks are possible. To address 
this problem several logic families have been introduced: 
asynchronous logic [6], Sense Amplifier Based Logic [8] 
and Wave Dynamic Differential Logic [9]. They all em-
ploy some form of dynamic differential logic, sometimes 
also referred to as dual rail with precharge logic. In this 
logic, every signal transition is represented with a switch-
ing event, in which the logic gate charges a capacitance, 
even when the input signals remain constant. 
The major disadvantage of the asynchronous approach 
[6] is that it is extremely difficult. The methodology and 
tools for the design of large asynchronous logic circuits 
substantially lags behind that of synchronous circuits. 
Compared to EDA support for synchronous designs, which 
is very mature, there is still a shortage of CAD tools to 
support asynchronous circuit designs.  
Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [8] has been con-
ceived to thwart Differential Power Analysis (DPA). It 
uses advanced circuit techniques to guarantee that the load 
capacitance has a constant value. SABL completely con-
trols the portion of the load capacitance that is due to the 
logic gate. The intrinsic capacitances at the differential in- 
and output signals are symmetric and additionally it dis-
charges and charges the sum of all the internal node ca-
pacitances. A major disadvantage is the non-recurrent 
engineering costs of a custom designed cell library devel-
opment. SABL also suffers from a large clock load, as is 
common to all clocked dynamic logic styles.  
Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [9] is im-
plemented with static complementary CMOS logic, which 
is the default logic style used in standard cell libraries. 
Static CMOS standard cells are combined to form secure 
compound standard cells, which have a reduced power 
signature. Instead of pre-charging with a clock signal as is 
the case for SABL, in WDDL a pre-discharge wave travels 
through the circuit. In the precharge phase, the inputs to 
the WDDL gate are set at 0. This puts the output of the 
gate at 0 and the precharge wave travels over to the next 
gate of the combinatorial logic. By way of example, Fig. 2 
shows the WDDL AOI32 gate and the original static 
CMOS gate. Our WDDL library contains 128 cells. 
WDDL has many advantages. It can be readily imple-
mented from an existing standard cell library. The design 
flow is fully supported with accurate EDA library files that 
come directly from the vendor. WDDL also results in a 
dynamic and differential logic with only a small load ca-
pacitance on the precharge control signal and with the high 
noise margins of static CMOS. Furthermore, since the 
gates do not precharge in parallel, it also benefits from a 
low supply current derivative di/dt and peak supply cur-
rent. As a result, the supply bounce, often a critical prob-
lem for signal integrity, is lowered. 
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Fig. 2.  AOI32: static CMOS (left); and WDDL (right). 
Building WDDL logic at the logic level will reduce but 
not eliminate side channel attacks. At the transistor level, 
the implementation of the WDDL logic also needs to be 
balanced. It is essential in order to achieve constant power 
consumption that a fixed amount of charge is used per 
transition. A standard cell must always charge ideally the 
same load capacitance. Since a differential logic gate has 2 
outputs, of which only 1 switches per event, the load ca-
pacitances at the 2 outputs must be matched. The load 
capacitance consists of the intrinsic in- and output capaci-
tances of the cells and the interconnect capacitances be-
tween cells. Additional capacitances can be incorporated 
inside the compound gates to balance the intrinsic capaci-
tances. Or even custom designed WDDL gates can be 
made. Yet with shrinking channel-length of the transistors, 
the share of the interconnect capacitance in the total load 
capacitance increases and the interconnect capacitances 
will become the dominant capacitance [10]. Hence, the 
issue of matching the interconnect capacitances of the 
signal wires is crucial for the countermeasures to succeed. 
This is achieved through a special place & route approach.  
2.2 Multiple Differential Pair Routing 
The best strategy to achieve matched interconnect ca-
pacitances is to route the output signals with routes that are 
at all times in parallel and on the same layers. Then inde-
pendent of the placement, the two routes have the same 
parasitic effects [11].  
The parasitic effects of the interconnects are caused by 
the resistance of the wires and by the capacitance to the 
substrate and to wires in upper and lower metal layers. 
Aside from process variations, these effects are equal for 
both nets. The resistance is the same since both intercon-
nects have the same length. The capacitances are made the 
same by the proposed differential routing since in general 
the length of the differential route is orders of magnitude 
larger then the distance between the 2 differential routes 
and one can therefore argue that both nets travel in the 
same environment. 
The pair of interconnects however, need not only to be 
routed with the same capacitance but also with control 
over cross-talk. Cross-talk is the phenomenon of noise 
induced on one wire by a signal switching on a parallel 
wire. This has an effect on the power consumption. Cross-
talk effects are caused by the capacitance to adjacent wires 
in the same metal layer. Shielding the differential routes on 
either side with a power or ground line eliminates the 
cross-talk. Alternatively increasing the distance between 
the different differential pairs reduces the effect. The 
tradeoff is an increase in silicon area.  
Differential pair routing has been available through 
gridless routers. But their goal is to route a few critical 
signals, such as the clock or general reset signal. They are 
not built for crypto applications where all signals need a 
differential route and thus router performance and comple-
tion rate degrade rapidly with increasing number of differ-
ential pairs. These tools are unable to route 20K+ differen-
tial pairs as an encryption algorithm requires. High-
capacity gridded routers on the other hand have no or only 
limited capability to route differential pairs and often avoid 
running wires in parallel to prevent cross-talk effects.  
We have recently presented a way to work around tool 
limitations [11]. The technique is built on top of a com-
mercial place & route tool and forces the tool to route the 
two output signals at all times in adjacent tracks. In the 
technique, each differential output pair is abstracted as one 
single “fat” wire. The differential design is routed with the 
fat wire and at the end the fat wire is decomposed into the 
differential wire. Fig. 3 demonstrates the place & route 
approach. The figure shows a placed & routed design 
consisting of 6 gates. At the left, the result is shown of the 
fat routing. At the right, the result after decomposition is 
shown. Two normal wires replace each fat wire.  
Fig. 3.  Fat design (left); and differential design (right).  
2.3 Automated Design Flow 
We will now describe the secure digital design flow. 
Please recall that the design flow is depicted in Fig. 1. 
In the logic design phase, the design specifications (de-
sign specs) are translated into a behavioral model (be-
havior.v). This is the creative phase in the IC design. 
Logic synthesis is the process of mapping the behav-
ioral model (behavior.v) into logic gates of the library 
file (lib.v). It generates a gate level description of the 
desired circuit (rtl.v). The constraints file (script)
contains area and timing optimization directives. It also 
limits the type of gates used during synthesis. The gates 
available for synthesis depend on the WDDL cells that 
have been assembled. The library file is the original static 
CMOS standard cell library file.  
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The cell substitution procedure modifies the gate level 
description. A script, e.g. in PERL or in Awk, transforms 
the gate level netlist (rtl.v). Two files are generated: a 
fat gate level netlist (fat.v), which will be used to route 
the design, and a differential gate level netlist, which will 
be used in the verification tasks. The differential netlist is 
obtained by replacing each gate by its WDDL counterpart. 
The inverters are also removed; the inversions are imple-
mented by switching the nets. The fat netlist is equivalent 
to the differential netlist except that the differential signals 
have been abstracted as one single signal. This procedure 
is not present in a regular design flow. The run time over-
head is negligible. The parser required a little less then 4 
minutes to generate both files for a prototype IC containing 
39000 gates on a SunFire v100 (550MHz., 2GB RAM). 
In the place & route step, the fat gate level netlist 
(fat.v) is placed and routed. The place & route tool re-
quires a fat gate library database (fat_lib.lef). The 
library database contains cell macros and routing rules. 
Information from the original library files is used in proce-
dures such as clock routing and timing driven placement. 
The resulting design file (fat.def) specifies the location 
of the cells in the core and of the interconnect wires.  
The fat to differential routing transformation consists of 
two separate procedures: (1) a duplication and translation 
of the fat wires; and (2) a width reduction.  
The interconnect decomposition procedure accom-
plishes the duplication and translation. This procedure 
edits the fat design file (fat.def). In a design file, wire 
segments are represented by lines between 2 points. The 
parser duplicates and translates the coordinates of the 
points. This is the second procedure not present in a regu-
lar design flow. It has a negligible timing overhead. The 
parser required 2 minutes to generate the differential de-
sign file (diff.def) for our 39K gate IC. 
The width reduction is accomplished by updating the li-
brary database with the differential library database during 
the stream out of the design. In this step, the differential 
design file (diff.def) and the differential library data-
base (diff_lib.lef), which contains the normal wire 
definition and the differential gate macros, are combined in 
the place & route tool to generate the layout (layout).
A WDDL gate is composed of gates that are supported 
by the vendor library. The standard verifications, executed 
in each stage, accurately verify functionality, delay and 
area in function of the original gates. Two extra measures 
validate the inserted cell substitution and interconnect 
decomposition procedures. A logic equivalence checker, 
such as Formality [12] or Verplex LEC [13] verifies the 
equivalence between the fat gate level netlist and the origi-
nal netlist. Importing the differential gate level netlist 
during the stream out procedure verifies the equivalence 
between differential gate level netlist and the differential 
placed and routed design file.  
3 Design Example 
A test circuit is implemented through the secure digital 
design flow and through a regular digital design flow using 
ordinary static CMOS standard cells. The block diagram of 
the test circuit is depicted in Fig. 4. This circuit has been 
presented as a sufficient subset of the DES algorithm on 
which a Differential Power Analysis can be mounted [5]. 
The algorithm has been reduced to this setup such that the 
instantaneous supply current transient can be simulated 
with the transistor level simulator Hspice. 
Fig. 5 shows the resulting layouts. The secure imple-
mentation and the reference implementation require 
12880µm2 and 3782µm2 respectively. The WDDL com-
pound gates have been derived from the 0.18µm, 1.8V 
static CMOS standard cell library that has been used in the 
regular design flow. The single ended gate level netlist has 
been obtained through DesignAnalyzer [12]. Place & route 
have been done in Silicon Ensemble [13] with an aspect 
ratio of 1 and a fill factor of 80%. The language Awk is 
used in the parser to generate the fat and differential net-
lists. The spice netlists, which include the layout parasitics, 
have been extracted in Virtuoso [13]. In total, 2000 input 
vectors have been consecutively encrypted with a random 
input at the plaintext PL and PR, and with a fixed secret key 
K, equal to 46. The clock frequency of the circuit is chosen 
at 125MHz, and 800 ‘measurement’ samples are made per 
clock cycle.  
The clock and input signals are driven by cascaded in-
verters to provide realistic data and clock signals. The 
power consumption of the additional input circuitry is 
excluded from the measurements. The mean energy con-
sumption is 27.1pJ and 4.6pJ for the secure implementa- 
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Fig. 4.  Design example: DPA on a module of DES [5]. 
Fig. 5.  Layout with: regular digital design flow (left); 
and secure digital design flow (right).  
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tion and the reference implementation respectively. The 
normalized energy deviation, which specifies the absolute 
range of the variation on the energy consumption per en-
cryption, is 6.6% and 60%. The normalized standard de-
viation is 0.9% and 12%.  
Fig. 6 shows the result from the DPA on the transient 
SPICE simulation on the extracted netlists, including all 
parasitic capacitances. Note that in a DPA, the supply 
current measurements are divided over 2 sets by means of 
a selection function and a guess on the secret key. The 
correct secret key is found with the aid of the differential 
traces. A differential trace is the difference between the 
typical supply currents of the two sets. The difference will 
approach zero for a wrong key guess, but has noticeable 
peaks if the correct secret key has been predicted. 
The resistance against DPA is quantified with the MTD, 
the number of measurements to disclosure. Fig. 6 (left) 
shows that for the reference design 250 measurements are 
sufficient to disclose the secret key. The secure digital 
design flow on the other hand has been effective in reduc-
ing the peaks of the differential trace of the correct secret 
key: the peak-to-peak value of the secret key is conforming 
with the peak-to-peak value of the other key guesses. The 
Differential Power Analysis does not reveal the secret key. 
Fig. 6 (right) shows the peak-to-peak value of the differen-
tial traces of the secret key guesses for 2000 measure-
ments. The secret key clearly stands out for the reference 
implementation.  
Perfect security does not exist. Despite the fact that for 
instance noise and measurement errors will reinforce the 
level of security, increasing the number of samples may 
expose the secret key of the secure design. The more pow-
erful an attacker is, the better his results may be. On the 
other hand, the more one is willing to invest, the higher the 
security will be. Shielded lines or a larger pitch, balanced 
intrinsic capacitances or custom designed cells, etc. will 
improve the security. With the introduction of the secure 
digital design flow, the problem has been reduced to a 
problem of parasitic effects. 
4 Secure Digital Design Flow and other SCAs  
A secure digital design flow must create a system that is 
secure against the collection of known practical side-
channel attacks. In the preceding sections, we have dealt 
with power attacks. We will now discuss how the design 
flow creates a system that thwarts timing attacks, Electro-
magnetic Analysis and Differential Fault Analysis.  
4.1 Timing Attacks  
Timing attacks are a class of cryptanalysis that takes 
advantage of timing information [1]. For instance, the 
arrival time of the ciphertext may be determined by opera-
tions that depend on the secret key. Making the power 
consumption uniform does not remove the threat of a tim-
ing attack. Conditional branching with unequal lengths for 
Fig. 6. Measurements to disclosure (top); peak-to-peak 
of differential traces at 2000 measurements (bottom).  
example can still be seen. Therefore, a careful design that 
at all times has a worst case running time is still necessary.  
Power measurements can nevertheless provide substan-
tial timing information in spite of this conventional design 
practice. They expose idle cycles, which have been in-
serted to hide conditional branches with unequal lengths. If 
the state of the circuit does not change, the gates of a regu-
lar design will not switch and do not dissipate any power. 
This is not the case for a system that employs a logic style 
with a 100% switching factor, as is done in the secure 
digital design flow. When desired, idle cycles can be in-
serted. Every gate has a switching event in every cycle, 
whether or not useful data is processed or in other words 
whether or not idle cycles have been inserted. 
4.2 Electromagnetic Analysis  
The flow of electric charges produces an electromag-
netic field. Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) is the equiva-
lent of a power attack but instead uses the electromagnetic 
fields generated by the (dis)charging gates as the side 
channel information [3]. There are differences. A power 
attack has only access to the global power consumption. 
An EMA however, can do measurements that are confined 
Proceedings of the Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE’05) 
1530-1591/05 $ 20.00 IEEE 
to a small area of the security IC. On the other hand, a 
power attack can be mounted rather quickly with off-the-
shelf devices, whereas an EMA requires an advanced 
measurement setup.  
The electromagnetic fields are generated by the electric 
charge that flows through the power lines and either of the 
2 differential output wires. Since ideally the same amount 
of charge is used, the only option to differentiate between 
different switching events is to detect which of the 2 dif-
ferential output wires the charge flows through.  
The differential output wires have been routed at a dis-
tance of about 1µm apart with the special place & route 
approach, while their length is 10 to several 100µm. The 
measurement probe on the other hand is positioned at a 
few millimeters from the device [3]. The resulting meas-
urement setup is depicted in Fig. 7. The measurement 
probe must distinguish between electromagnetic fields 
generated between two antennas for which the distance in 
between (1µm) is orders of magnitude smaller then their 
length (10-100µm), while the distance between the probe 
and the antennas (1-10mm) is another multiple order of 
magnitude larger. Furthermore, many cells switch simulta-
neously and thus large numbers of antennas are broadcast-
ing at the same time and in the same area. In the available 
literature [3],[14],[15], a measurement setup with this kind 
of accuracy has not been demonstrated. 
4.3 Differential Fault Analysis  
In Differential Fault Analysis (DFA), the attacker tries 
to force an error in the internal state of the circuit, and 
subsequently exploit weaknesses of the algorithm under 
malfunctioning. The main countermeasure against DFA is 
fault detection. The idea is to monitor if one has tried to 
corrupt the computation, and in such an event to shut down 
the processor and delete any valuable information as soon 
as possible.  
A dynamic and differential logic style, such as WDDL, 
employs redundant encoding. This means that a state is 
actually represented by 2 bits instead of 1 bit, as is the case 
in a normal single ended logic, such as static CMOS logic. 
With redundant encoding error detection is possible. For 
instance, in a glitch attack, the clock frequency is tempo-
rarily increased with the intention to force a state-bit or a 
selected conditional branch by not giving enough time for 
all calculations to complete. If at the rising clock edge an 
input signal to a register is differential it means that it has 
correctly evaluated. On the other hand if both inputs re-
main at zero, the clock frequency has been increased and 
the circuit should be put in the alarm state. Of course, it is 
sufficient to monitor the critical path of the system. In 
other DFAs, electromagnetic radiation, such as light or 
radio waves, is used to flip a state-bit. Here a similar ap-
proach can be worked out, except that the detection is not 
restricted to 1 register. 
10-100µm
1µm
1-10mm 
Fig. 7. Measurement setup (not drawn to scale). 
5 Conclusions 
We have presented a secure digital design flow. The de-
sign flow provides an accessible means to fabricate a secu-
rity IC that is SCA resistant regardless of the implementa-
tion details. It relies on a logic style that has constant 
power consumption and a place & route approach that 
controls the parasitic effects. The design flow is com-
pletely supported by mainstream EDA tools and depending 
on the required level of security several options are avail-
able to strengthen the security. Experimental results have 
demonstrated that the design flow results in a DPA resis-
tant layout and we have argued the effective obstruction of 
a collection of know practical SCAs. 
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